Integrations
Exactly what we read, how, and where it stops.
Every connector is read-only. This is the permission list your reviewers will ask for, with what each connector supports today and its known limits.
Sources
Built in lab tested end to end against our own tenant In development built and tested with recorded data, no live tenant yet Planned not built
| Source | Maturity | Sign-in method | Exact permissions | What it reads | Supports | Known limits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Okta | Built in lab | API service app, OAuth 2.0 client credentials with a private key (private_key_jwt), Read-Only Administrator role | okta.users.read okta.logs.read okta.groups.read okta.apps.read okta.policies.read | Users and status, last sign-in, System Log events | Accounts, leaver and inactivity clocks, all sign-in detections | Sessions cannot be listed through the API; sign-in policies that might deny access are not evaluated; group and app assignments not yet mapped to access |
| Microsoft Entra ID | Built in lab | App registration, client credentials, admin consent | Directory.Read.All AuditLog.Read.All Policy.Read.All Device.Read.All (application permissions) | Users, enabled state, session revocation time, directory roles, service principals, app secret and certificate end dates, application owners, audit log, Conditional Access policies, sign-in log | Accounts, admin roles, workloads and owners, credential expiry, leaver and privileged clocks, sign-in capability through Conditional Access | Sign-in logs need Entra ID P1 or P2 (our lab has neither, so inactivity shows as cannot be verified); only block-all policies count as a full sign-in block; PIM activation history not read |
| PingOne | Built in lab | Worker application, client credentials | Roles: Identity Data Read Only, Environment Read Only. The connector warns if any role that can change data is granted. | Users, enabled and lock state, applications, activity events | Accounts, leaver clocks, sign-in capability, spray and multi-system detections | Sessions not exposed read-only; application entitlements not read |
| midPoint (governance) | Built in lab | REST API account with read access | Search users and roles (read) | Identities, status, end dates, assigned roles as approvals | Approval and privileged clocks, governance as leaver trigger when there is no HR record | Approval expiry, approver authority and request history not read |
| SailPoint Identity Security Cloud | In development | OAuth 2.0 client credentials with a personal access token of a user who can read identities | GET requests and one read-only query: POST /v2025/search | Identities, lifecycle state, access | Governance source for the same clocks as midPoint | Tested with recorded responses only; needs a live tenant before any claim |
| HR | Built in lab | CSV worker export placed in a folder | Read the export file | Worker ID, name, work email, worker type, status, hire and termination dates and reason | Leaver trigger, person matching | Direct HR system APIs (Workday and others) planned |
| Saviynt | Planned | Waiting for developer access. | ||||
Refresh: every pull reads the last 24 hours of events by default (configurable); vendor rate limits are respected with back-off. Each source records its sync time, and evidence older than 48 hours is treated as stale.
What each system lets us see
The access layers depend on what each vendor exposes read-only. Where a layer is blank, the product says so on every finding.
| Layer | Okta | Entra | PingOne | Governance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Account state | Status | accountEnabled | enabled | Status, end date |
| Sign-in possible | Status only | Enabled plus Conditional Access block policies | canAuthenticate, lock | Not a sign-in account |
| Sessions | Not observable | Session revocation time | Not observable | Not applicable |
| Use after trigger | System Log, last sign-in | Needs P1 or P2 | Activity events | Not applicable |
| What it holds | Not yet mapped | Directory roles | Not read | Approved roles |
Outputs
| Destination | Maturity | Format | Authentication | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Splunk | Built in lab | OCSF JSON over HTTP Event Collector | HEC token held with the other secrets | Only new or changed findings are sent; each carries its fingerprint |
| Any syslog SIEM | Built in lab | CEF in RFC 5424 syslog, TCP or UDP | Network controls | Tested over UDP against a local listener |
| Webhook | Built in lab | OCSF JSON | Optional bearer token and HMAC-SHA256 signature header | For ticketing, GRC or custom pipelines |
| Audit pack | Built in lab | JSON | Downloaded by a signed-in user | Rules, settings, every clock with history, coverage, chain verification and the head to keep |