Platform
Seven capabilities. Three working today.
VerifAIdentity is an assurance layer for identity: it checks that identity controls took effect in every system, and keeps the evidence. Here is the whole plan, and exactly how far each part has got.
The seven pillars
- 1
Cross-vendor sign-in monitoring
Built in labSign-in and admin events from every provider, normalised to OCSF and tied to one person, so an attack that is quiet in each system is visible in one place.
Today: Okta System Log, Entra audit log and PingOne activities; seven detections with published thresholds. Entra sign-in logs need Entra ID P1 or P2.
- 2
Identity assurance: compliance clocks and gap checks
Built in labLeavers, privileged access, access versus approval, inactivity and credential expiry run as deadline clocks with per-system evidence, layered access and explicit gaps.
Today: five controls, six clock states, access layers AL-1.0, signed evidence chain EC-1.0, audit pack and OCSF export.
- 3
AI identity analyst
Built in labPlain-English questions answered only from the connected data, citing records, declining when the evidence is not there.
Today: rule-grounded Ask and Daily Brief; 40-case evaluation (34 answered, 6 declined, all correct). The model-backed analyst is the next step.
- 4
Non-human identity governance
In developmentWorkloads typed and owned: service principals, managed identities and service accounts, with their secrets and their owners.
Today: identity types IG-1.0, credential expiry clocks, Microsoft first-party apps separated. Owners are collected from the next Entra sync; lifecycle is not managed.
- 5
AI-agent access verification
In developmentAI agents as first-class identities: who owns them, what they can reach, and whether delegation from a person can be shown.
Today: agents are typed by Entra tag (medium confidence) or name (low confidence). The lab has no AI agents yet, and delegation is not observable in the connected systems.
- 6
Identity verification
PlannedChecking that the person behind an account is who HR says, at hire and at risky moments, with proofing results kept as evidence.
Today: not started. Would connect to identity-proofing services rather than build one.
- 7
Behavioural assurance
PlannedSession-continuity signals that show whether the person using a session is still the person who started it.
Today: not started. Needs privacy review, accuracy targets and customer consent before any build.
Nothing here is production ready. "Built in lab" means it runs end to end on our simulated company with automated tests; a pilot is how each part gets measured on real data.
One graph for people, workloads and AI agents
Not every account belongs to one person. Each account gets a type, an owner state and the reason for both, with a confidence level.
- Types: human (member, guest, break-glass), workload (service principal, managed identity, service account), AI agent, application, HR record
- Owner states: a person, one or more recorded owners, none recorded, the vendor, or not collected yet
- Unmatched accounts stay unmatched as orphans; nothing is forced onto a person
- Reconciliation always shows its denominators: in our lab, 12 of 27 people are in two or more sign-in systems and 15 in one; 69 of 69 human accounts matched
The controls checked today
Each rule is versioned and has an owner, a severity and a scope. Deadlines are your settings, not ours.
| Control | What has to be true | Default deadline | Not checked yet |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leaver access removed everywhere | Every sign-in account in scope is off after the HR termination date; each account described in access layers. | 24 hours | Application-level sessions; policy-defined exceptions |
| Privileged roles approved | Every admin role holder has a matching approval in governance. | 72 hours | Approval authority, duration and PIM activation history |
| Access matches approval | Every active sign-in account traces to an approved access record. | 72 hours | Effective permissions inside applications |
| Inactive accounts disabled | Each person is used or disabled within the period, judged across all their accounts. | 90 days, warning 14 days before | Systems without sign-in data (shown as cannot be verified) |
| Credentials rotated before expiry | App secrets and certificates are rotated before their end date. | Warning 30 days before | Secrets outside Entra app registrations |
Clock states
Every clock is in exactly one of six states.
- Breached
The deadline has passed and fresh evidence shows the control still failing.
- Cannot be verified
A source is stale or does not report what the rule needs. Shown as a gap, never as a pass.
- Running
The clock has started and the deadline has not passed yet. You see how long is left.
- Fixed late
Fixed after the deadline. Kept as an audit exception with how the fix time was found.
- Met
Fixed in time, confirmed by fresh evidence from every system in scope.
- Retired
The rule or account no longer applies. Kept in history and in the evidence chain, not deleted.
Cross-vendor detections
Thresholds are settings, shown here at their defaults. Each detection lists the telemetry it needs; test cases and known limits are on the Methods page.
| Detection | Fires when | Needs | MITRE ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|---|
| Password spray across systems | One source address fails against 5 or more people within 30 minutes, in any connected system | Failed sign-ins with source address | T1110.003 |
| Brute force against one person | 8 or more failures for one person within 15 minutes | Failed sign-ins per user | T1110.001 |
| Success after repeated failures | 3 or more failures, then a success, for one person within 60 minutes | Failed and successful sign-ins | T1110, T1078 |
| One person failing in several systems | Failures for the same person in two or more systems within 30 minutes | Sign-ins from two or more providers | T1110 |
| Activity by a person who has left | A sign-in or admin action after the HR termination date | HR export and sign-in or audit events | T1078, T1078.004 |
| Admin change by an unknown identity | An admin action by an identity with no governance record | Audit events and governance | T1098 |
| Sign-in failure spike | Failures in one system reach 5 an hour and three times the normal rate | A history of sign-in events | T1110 (or an outage) |